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NOTE
RETRACING FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE: CULMINATION IN
CHURCH OF THE LUKUMI BABALU AYE, INC. V. CITY OF
HIALEAH AND RESOLUTION IN THE RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
[Tihe guarantee of religious liberty embodied in the Free
Exercise Clause affirmatively requires government to create
an atmosphere of hospitality and accommodation to individ-
ual belief or disbelief In short, I think our Constitution
commands the positive protection by government of religious
freedom-not only for a minority, however small-not only
for a majority, however large-but for each of us.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The above comments of Justice Stewart recognize the myriad
of religious beliefs and practices which exist in our nation of
diverse people.2 Protecting them all from government infringe-
ment has become an increasingly lofty aim as the number and
nature of religions in the United States continue to grow.
1. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 415-16 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
2. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp.
1467, 1482 (S.D. Fla. 1989) affd, 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct.
2217 (1993). "Migration has been the lifeblood of this country. As each of the tens of
thousands came, they brought with them their unique heritages which were ultimate-
ly integrated and woven into the fabric which is America. The strength of that fabric
has grown over two centuries." Id.
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The First Amendment has historically provided a haven for
religions by prohibiting laws "respecting the establishment of a
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...." The
standard used to review burdens on the right to free exercise
has been the subject of decades of jurisprudence by the
Supreme Court. The Court's most recent expression on this
standard was announced in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah4 which held that ordinances prohibiting
the religious practice of animal sacrifice must survive strict
scrutiny review to pass constitutional muster. However, in an
unusual assertion of authority, Congress voted to preempt the
Court's doctrine by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA)5 which essentially codifies strict scrutiny review as
set forth in prior Supreme Court rulings.' This comment re-
traces the evolution of strict scrutiny review under the Free
Exercise Clause beginning with Part II, which discusses the
inception and development of the standard. Part III details the
decline of strict scrutiny review preceding the Hialeah case. As
the Court's final stance on strict scrutiny review under the Free
Exercise Clause, the ruling in Hialeah is discussed in Part VI.
Finally, Part V gives a general introduction to RFRA and ex-
plores the legislative history preceding its passage. RFRA
marks the end of a tumultuous journey for strict scrutiny re-
view and demonstrates the continued high regard for religious
freedom as a founding principle of our nation.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. 113 S. CT. 2217 (1993).
5. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488 [hereinafter RFRAI.
6. Id. An expressed purpose of the Act is "to restore the compelling interest test
as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened." Id.
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H. EVOLUTION OF STRICT SCRUTINY UNDER THE FREE
EXERCISE CLAUSE
A. Dichotomy Between Religious Beliefs and Conduct
The Constitution provides that Congress "shall make no law
respecting the establishment of a religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof . . . ." However, the First Amendment
principle of religious freedom does not necessarily extend to the
practices and conduct associated with the protected belief. The
distinction between belief and action was first articulated in
Reynolds v. United States.8 In Reynolds, the Supreme Court
upheld the conviction of a man under a Utah statute proscrib-
ing the practice of bigamy. Reynolds was knowingly married to
two different women and believed that such conduct was man-
dated by his membership in the Mormon Church.9 In address-
ing Reynolds' assertion that his right to practice bigamy was
protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court focused its
inquiry on which religious freedoms were actually guaranteed
by the First Amendment.'0 The Court looked to the legislative
history of the clause and concluded that Congress has no power
to restrict religious opinions and beliefs, but is "left free to
reach actions which [are] in violation of social duties or subver-
sive of good order."" The Court then found that the Utah leg-
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
9. Id. at 161. As a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
Reynolds believed that he had a duty to practice polygamy and that failure to do so
would result in "damnation." See id.
10. Id. at 162.
11. Id. at 164 (emphasis added). The Court was persuaded by the following
statement made by Thomas Jefferson in a letter to the Danbury Baptist Association:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
man and his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or his
worship; that the legislative powers of the government reach actions only,
and not opinions,-I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the
whole American people which declared that their legislature should 'make
no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and
State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in
behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the
progress of those sentiments which tend to restore man to all his natural
rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social du-
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islature had the authority to enact legislation which proscribed
the practice of polygamy in the interests of maintaining social
order.
12
The decision in Reynolds clearly stood for the proposition that
the freedom to believe is absolute. However, the Court did not
determine whether constitutional protection under the Free
Exercise Clause extended to religious practices and conduct. In
Cantwell v. Connecticut,"3 the Court had an opportunity to
elaborate on the dichotomy between belief and conduct set forth
in Reynolds. The case involved the solicitous activities of three
members of the Jehovah's Witnesses which resulted in convic-
tions for breaching the peace. 4 The Court explained that the
First Amendment "embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe
and freedom to act." Although the first is absolute, the Court
held that the freedom to act must inevitably be susceptible to
government regulation in the interests of society. 8 Although
recognizing the state's authority to regulate solicitation where
there existed an immediate threat to public safety, peace or
order,' the Court found that the conduct of the Jehovah's
Witnesses did not pose such a danger." In reversing the con-
victions, the Court held that although the government has the
power to regulate religious conduct, that authority "must be so
exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to in-
fringe the protected freedom." 9 The ruling in Cantwell estab-
ties.
Id. (quoting 8 Jeff. Works, 113).
12. See id. at 164-66.
13. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
14. Id. at 301-02.
15. Id. at 303.
16. See id. at 303-04.
17. Id. at 308.
18. Id. at 310.
We find in the instant case no assault or threatening of bodily harm, no
truculent bearing, no intentional discourtesy, no personal abuse. On the
contrary, we find only an effort to persuade a willing listener to buy a
book or to contribute money in the interest of what Cantwell, however
misguided others may think him, conceived to be true religion.
19. Id. at 304.
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lished that religious practices warrant some constitutional pro-
tection from the Free Exercise Clause, but left unanswered the
reach of the protection.
B. The Burden Concept
Although certain that religious practices were not afforded
the same constitutional protection as the beliefs from which
they originated, the Supreme Court had yet to define a clear
standard of review for government regulations which infringed
on the conduct of individuals. The first step toward defining
such a standard was taken in Braunfeld v. Brown.20
The Braunfeld case involved a Pennsylvania statute prohibit-
ing the sale of certain commodities on Sunday. Violations of the
Sunday closing law were subject to criminal penalties. 1
Braunfeld was a merchant in Philadelphia and sold clothing
and home furnishings expressly covered by the statute.
Braunfeld was also a member of the Orthodox Jewish faith
which required that members abstain from work each week
from nightfall on Friday until nightfall on Saturday.2
Braunfeld challenged the statute as unconstitutional on the
grounds that it disallowed him from recovering on Sundays the
financial losses incurred as a result of his observance of the
Sabbath on Saturdays.' Braunfeld asserted that the statute
forced members of the Orthodox Jewish faith to choose between
forgoing their Sabbath observance or suffering a "serious eco-
nomic disadvantage."'
The Court echoed the principle established in Reynolds by
holding that Braunfeld's freedom to advocate the Orthodox
Jewish religion was absolute.25 However, the Court noted that
the government may restrict "people's actions when they are
found to be in violation of important social duties or subversive
20. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
21. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.10 (1960).
22. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 601.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 602.
25. Id. at 603 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)).
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of good order, even when the actions are demanded by one's
religion."26 The Court then advanced a means for classifying
government regulations which impede religious practices by
examining the burden imposed on the religious practice in ques-
tion. The Court distinguished between direct burdens, which
make the conduct unlawful, and indirect or incidental burdens,
which serve only to make a particular religious practice less
convenient. In applying this distinction to Pennsylvania's
closing statute, the Court held that no direct burden was im-
posed on Orthodox Jews because the regulation did not make
the observance of the Sabbath on Saturday unlawful.' The
Court acknowledged that the statute would indirectly operate to
the economic disadvantage of the appellant, but held that the
law affected only those members of the Orthodox Jewish faith
who felt obliged to work on Sundays.29 The Court felt that the
purpose of the statute in providing a "weekly respite from all
labor" was a secular goal within the authority of the state.30 It
would be unreasonable to expect that all regulations enacted by
the state would not incidentally burden some religions given
the diverse practices of different faiths.
31
Although the Court held that the Pennsylvania statute did
not violate the religious liberties of the appellant, the decision
significantly expanded the protection afforded religious conduct
under the Free Exercise Clause.82 First, the Court held that
even indirect burdens on religious conduct may be unconstitu-
tional under the Free Exercise Clause where the purpose of the
statute is "to impede the observance" -of a religion or purpose-
26. Id. at 603-04.
27. Id. at 605.
28. Id. at 605-06.
29. Id. at 605. "[The statute at bar does not make unlawful any religious
practices of appellants; the Sunday law simply regulates a secular activity and, as
applied to appellants, operates so as to make the practice of their religious beliefs
more expensive." Id.
30. Id. at 607 (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 44445 (1951)).
31. See id. at 606.
32. Robert A. Torricella, Jr., Comment, Babalu Aye Is Not Pleased:
Majoritarianism and the Erosion of Free Exercise, 45 U. MIAM L. REV. 1061, 1072
(1991).
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fully to discriminate between religions.3 Second, the Court
elevated the standard of review by requiring the government to
demonstrate that the statute has a secular purpose which can-
not be accomplished "by means which do not impose such a
burden."' The standards announced in Braunfeld, notwith-
standing the judgment, significantly heightened the constitu-
tional regard for religious practices given by the Court and
moved the standard of review further toward strict scrutiny.
C. Final Realization of Strict Scrutiny Review
The next phase in the evolution of strict scrutiny review
under the Free Exercise Clause was realized in Sherbert v.
Verner. 5 Adell Sherbert was discharged from employment at a
South Carolina textile mill for her refusal to work on Satur-
days. As a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, Sher-
bert abstained from work on Saturdays in observance of her
Sabbath." After unsuccessful attempts to find alternative em-
ployment which would allow her to comply with this aspect of
her faith, Sherbert filed for unemployment benefits under the
South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act.3  The
State's Employment Security Commission found that Sherbert
was not eligible for the benefits pursuant to language in the
Act which disqualified individuals who failed to accept suitable
work without good cause." The Commission's findings were ul-
timately affirmed by the South Carolina Supreme Court. 9
On review, the United States Supreme Court began its opin-
ion referring to the principle in Braunfeld that conduct motivat-
ed by religious beliefs is protected by the First Amendment, but
not entirely free from government regulation. The government
may place legislative restrictions on religious conduct in the
33. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607.
34. See id.; Torricela, supra note 32, at 1072.
35. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
36. See id. at 394-402.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 400-01 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 68-113(3), -114(2), (3) (Law Co-op.
1976)).
39. Id. at 401.
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interests of "public safety, peace or order."4" The Court then
distinguished the South Carolina Act as applied to Sherbert on
the grounds that her insistence on observing Saturday as the
Sabbath posed no threat which would warrant government
regulation. 41 Accordingly, the Court held that
[ilf... the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is
to withstand appellant's constitutional challenge, it must be
either because her disqualification ... represents no in-
fringement by the State of her constitutional rights of free
exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free exer-
cise of appellant's religion may be justified by a "compelling
state interest in the regulation of a subject within the
State's constitutional power to regulate... 42
Having set these parameters, the Court held that the disquali-
fication for unemployment benefits imposed a burden on Sher-
bert. The Court felt that the ineligibility of Sherbert was dis-
criminatory in that she was excluded from the benefits solely
because of her religious beliefs." Furthermore, the Court
found that the Commission's ruling forced Sherbert to choose
between adhering to her religious principles and accepting gain-
ful employment. The Court likened this choice to a fine as-
sessed against Sherbert for her Sabbath observance stating that
the resulting burden inflicted by either is similar.'
After concluding that the Act placed an indirect burden on
Sherbert's right to free exercise, the Court inquired whether
enforcing the Act to disqualify Sherbert could be justified by a
compelling state interest.45 The Commission failed to persuade
the Court that the interest behind the ineligibility provisions, to
guard against the potential for fraudulent claims by "unscrupu-
40. Id. at 403.
41. Id. Although Braunfeld also involved observance of the Sabbath on Saturday,
the Court seemed to distinguish it based on the existence of a secular goal in
Braunfeld-a goal in Sherbert.
42. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
43. Id. at 404.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 406.
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lous claimants," was anything more than a possibility.46 The
Court went on to hold that even if this asserted objective was
compelling, the Commission would still be obliged to show that
"no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses
without infringing First Amendment rights."'
The language used by the Court mirrored the essential ele-
ments of strict scrutiny review. Requiring the state to demon-
strate a "compelling interest," as well as a lack of any less
burdensome alternatives, clearly raised the level of review to
strict scrutiny.' However, in the cases which followed, the
Supreme Court continued to recognize strict scrutiny as the
appropriate standard and seemed willing to maintain this
heightened level of protection for religious conduct and practic-
es.49 Instead, the Court subsequently disregarded strict scruti-
ny review in a number of free exercise cases under the guise of
exemptions to the Sherbert ruling based on the absence of gov-
ernment compulsion. The Court's indifference to the established
strict scrutiny standard prevented the Free Exercise Clause
from serving as meaningful protection to actions motivated by
religious conduct.
III. DETERIORATION OF THE STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD
A. United States v. Lee: Weakening the Standard
Although the Supreme Court never rejected the use of strict
scrutiny review, 'the disregard of the standard in subsequent
free exercise cases seriously undermined precedent 'protecting
the constitutional freedom to act in accordance with religious
beliefs. The first indication of this trend weakening the strict
46. Id. at 407. The Court declined to fully assess the state's asserted interest be-
cause it had not been previously advanced before the South Carolina Supreme Court.
Id.
47. Id. at 407.
48. See Torricella, supra note 32, at 1074.
49. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S.
707 (1981); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). For an analysis of the
use of strict scrutiny following the Sherbert decision, see Torricella, supra note 32, at
1064-72.
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scrutiny standard came in United States v. Lee.5° Lee was a
member of the Old Order Amish and employed a number of his
fellow Amish to work on his farm and in his carpentry shop. As
a member of an Amish community, Lee opposed the payment or
receipt of social security benefits and failed to file the quarterly
social security tax returns required by the legislation."
The Court recognized that the statute mandating compulsory
participation in the social security system placed a burden on
the religious liberties of members of the Old Order Amish.52
Rather than analyzing the constitutionality of this burden un-
der the strict scrutiny review instituted in Sherbert, the Court
applied a diluted version of the "compelling interest" and "least
burdensome means" standards. First, the Court saw the appro-
priate inquiry as whether the state had demonstrated an over-
riding governmental interest. The Court felt this standard was
satisfied by the state's general concern for mandatory and con-
tinuous participation and demanded no further articulation as
to why Lee must be compelled to pay the tax.53
Likewise, the Court did not examine whether the state's
interests were fulfilled through the least burdensome means.
Instead, the Court simply inquired as to whether accommodat-
ing the Amish belief would "unduly interfere" with the achieve-
ment of the state's goals.' 4 Under this lower standard, the
Court held that the nature of a uniform tax system makes it
difficult to accommodate the "myriad exceptions flowing from a
wide variety of religious beliefs."55 In addition, the Court noted
that Congress had made accommodations of religious objections
to the extent possible in the exemption provision of the legisla-
tion. Thus, the Court concluded that the system must be uni-
50. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
51. Id. at 254.
52. Id. at 257. The Court accepted the appellee's assertion that payment and re-
ceipt of social security benefits is forbidden by the Old Order Amish. Id.
53. See id. at 258-59. But see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
54. Lee, 455 U.S. at 259.
55. Id. at 259-60. "The tax system could not function if denominations were
allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner
that violates their religious belief." Id. at 260.
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formly applicable except as otherwise provided by Congress.5"
The looser standard applied in the Lee decision paved the way
for further erosion of strict scrutiny review in later cases.
B. Bowen v. Roy and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n: Limiting the Scope of Strict Scrutiny Review
After United States v. Lee, the Court continued to detract
from the protection of religious practices by virtually abandon-
ing the strict scrutiny test in later cases. In Bowen v. Roy,
5 7
the Court did not apply strict scrutiny review because of the
nature of the burden involved. The appellees in Bowen chal-
lenged a condition under the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children program and the Food Stamp program which required
that applicants furnish the Social Security number of their
daughter in order to receive benefits.58 In accordance with
their Native American religious beliefs, the appellees felt that
complying with this condition would rob the spirit of their dau-
ghter by destroying her uniqueness with an identifying num-
ber.59 The Court recognized that Bowen involved an incidental
burden on the appellees' free exercise liberties by prompting
them to choose between "securing a governmental benefit and
adherence to religious beliefs."6" However, the Court went on
to distinguish this kind of burden from those government ac-
tions that criminalized a particular practice or otherwise com-
pelled an individual to violate his religious beliefs. 1 Thus, by
holding that incidental burdens did not warrant strict scrutiny
review, the Court did not explicitly reject the standard, but
dramatically limited the circumstances in which it is applica-
ble.6" The Court then advanced a less formidable standard for
56. Id. at 260-61.
57. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
58. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 695.
59. Id. at 696.
60. Id. at 706.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 707.
The test applied in cases like Wisconsin v. Yoder ... is not appropriate
in this setting. In the enforcement of a facially neutral and uniformly
applicable requirement for the administration of welfare programs reach-
ing many millions of people, the Government is entitled to wide latitude.
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neutral, uniformly applicable regulations, holding that a
challenged regulation is constitutionally permissible if it is
"neutral and uniform in its application, [and] is a reasonable
means of promoting a legitimate public interest.""
This narrowing of the function of strict scrutiny review under
the Free Exercise Clause continued in Lyng v. Northwest Indi-
an Cemetery Protective Association.' The religious burden at
issue in Lyng was the adverse effects that road construction
through forest land would have on Native Americans who con-
ducted traditional rituals in the area.65 The Court again dis-
tinguished such an indirect burden from those involving com-
pulsion by the government to violate religious beliefs, or denial
to "any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privi-
leges enjoyed by other citizens."6" In holding that the Govern-
ment was not required to assert a compelling interest to contin-
ue construction, the Court referred to the constitutional text of
the First Amendment as critical to its decision: "the Free Exer-
cise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot
do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can
exact from the government." 7 These exceptions to the applica-
tion of strict scrutiny gradually developed into the new stan-
dard of review for challenges under the Free Exercise Clause as
announced in Employment Division, Oregon Department of Hu-
man Resources v. Smith.
The Government should not be put to the strict test applied by the Dis-
trict Court; that standard required the Government to justify enforcement
of the use of Social Security number requirement as the least restrictive
means of accomplishing a compelling state interest.
Id.
63. Id.
64. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
65. See id. at 448.
66. Id. at 449.
67. Id. at 451 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J.,
concurring)).
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C. Employment Division, Oregon Department of Human Re-
sources v. Smith. The Final Curtain Strict Scrutiny Review
The religious principles of Native Americans again provided
the context for implementing a weaker standard of review for
challenges under the Free Exercise Clause. The appellees in
Employment Division, Oregon Department of Human Resources
v. Smith' had been discharged from their jobs at a drug reha-
bilitation clinic for ingesting peyote, as was customary, during a
ceremony of the Native American Church.69 When the appel-
lees sought unemployment compensation from the Employment
Division, they were considered ineligible because they had been
fired for work-related misconduct.70 The issue before the Court
was whether denying these benefits violated the appellees'
rights under the Free Exercise Clause.
After a number of cases which lessened or ignored the strict
scrutiny standard provided in Sherbert v. Verner,"1 the Su-
preme Court in Smith expressly held that strict scrutiny was
an inappropriate standard of review for generally applicable
criminal laws.72 First, the Court examined Oregon's law pro-
hibiting the ingestion of peyote and held that regulating such
conduct was within the authority of the state. The Court saw
no intent to discriminate against a particular religious sect or
to regulate spiritual beliefs. 3 The very essence of a law in-
volves the governing of one's actions.74 Thus, the Court held
that an individual is not relieved of his duty to comply with a
"valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground
that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes)." 5
68. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
69. See id at 874.
70. Id. at 873.
71. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
72. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85.
73. Id. at 882.
74. Id. at 879.
75. Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
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The second precept of the Court's decision was that the strict
scrutiny level of review was inapplicable to "across-the-board
criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct."76 Review-
ing the Free Exercise Clause in a historical context, the Court
noted that a state law had only been invalidated under strict
scrutiny in cases involving unemployment compensation.77
These cases shared the similar focus of determining whether
the state refused benefits to an individual because of his reli-
gious beliefs. The Court distinguished exemptions under unem-
ployment compensation regulations from cases involving crimi-
nal laws that are facially neutral and generally applicable.
The Court held that the state's ability to enforce criminal
laws for the protection of society warranted a looser standard of
review because the government's authority to regulate action
cannot be obstructed by the potential effect on an individual's
spiritual development."8 "To make an individual's obligation to
obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his
religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is 'com-
pelling'-permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, 'to become a
law unto himself,'-contradicts both constitutional tradition and
common sense."79  The Court cautioned against improper
borrowing of the "compelling interest test" from other constitu-
tional fields such as racial discrimination and the suppression
of free speech. 0 The Court held that the First Amendment did
not require strict scrutiny for religious burdens stemming from
generally applicable, nondiscriminatory laws.
76. Id. at 884.
77. Id. at 883. The Court noted that all the cases which have used strict
scrutiny to invalidate a government action involved entitlement to unemployment
compensation. Id. (citing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Conm'n, 480 U.S. 136
(1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
78. Id. at 885.
79. Id. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878) (upholding a
law prohibiting the religious practice of polygamy)).
80. Id. at 885-86. "What it produces in those other fields--equality of treatment
and an unrestricted flow of contending speech-are constitutional norms; what it
would produce here-a private right to ignore generally applicable laws-is a constitu-
tional anomaly." Id.
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The Court determined that whether or not to accommodate a
religious practice was an issue to be resolved in the political
process of the legislature.81 Such an "unavoidable consequence
of democratic government must be preferred to a system in
which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges
weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of
all religious beliefs."82 The Smith decision officially banished
strict scrutiny review in circumstances where a criminal law
was being challenged and forwarded a less potent standard
requiring only that the law be facially neutral and generally
applicable. "At best, the Supreme Court's holding in Smith
signals a 'cutback on the scope of protection afforded by the
First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause.' At its worst, 'Smith
reduces the free-exercise clause [sic] to a cautious
redundancy.
'
"
3
What Smith did not do was clearly define what circumstanc-
es, if any, warranted the application of strict scrutiny review
under the Free Exercise Clause.
IV. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah
A. Background
The Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye practices the Santeria
religion which was brought to the United States by Cuban
exiles who fled the Castro regime in the late 1950's and early
1960's. Historically, the Church was an underground religion,
not socially accepted by the majority in Cuba. In the United
States, the religion continues to be practiced privately in homes
by extended family groups.'M An integral part of the religion is
sacrificing animals including "chickens, pigeons, doves, ducks,
81. See id. at 890.
82. Id.
83. Torricella, supra note 32, at 1094 (citing Religious Liberty Claims in Min-
nesota Subject to Compelling State Interest Test, 59 U.S.L.W. 1082 (1990); Douglas
Laycock, Watering Down the Free Exercise Clause, 107 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 518, 519
(1990)).
84. Id. at 1470.
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guinea fowl, goats, sheep, and turtles .... 85 The sacrifices
are made on a variety of occasions including healing and the
initiation of priests. In the initiation rite, as many as fifty-six
small animals may be sacrificed in one day. 6
Ernest Picardo, the president and priest of the Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, was the appellant. In 1987, the Church
leased a plot of land in Hialeah, Florida with the objective of
establishing a church which would bring the Santeria faith, as
well as its animal sacrifice practices, into the open. 7 The
plans for the new church distressed many residents of the
Hialeah community. These concerns prompted the city council
to hold an emergency public session on June 9, 1987.8 At the
meeting, a number of ordinances and resolutions were
adopted. 9 The first resolution pronounced the commitment of
the city council to prohibit the acts of any religious group found
to be inconsistent with public morals.90 Subsequent resolutions
combined to prohibit the sacrificing of animals in a private or
public ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consump-
tion. The prohibition was limited to any individual or group
that "kills, slaughters or sacrifices animals for any type of
ritual, regardless of whether or not the flesh or blood of the
animal is to be consumed.'" 91
The Church and Picardo filed an action in the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida against the city of Hialeah, its mayor, and the
individual members of city council. The complaint, alleging that
the resolutions violated the appellants' rights under the Free
Exercise Clause, sought declaratory judgment, and injunctive
and monetary relief.92
85. Id. at 1471.
86. Id. at 1474.
87. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217,
2223 (1993).
88. Id.
89. See id.; see also 113 S. Ct. at 2234.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2224 (citations omitted). Exemptions were expressly made for slaugh-
terhouses and other licensed establishments. Id.
92. Id.
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B. District Court Decision
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
individual defendants. In determining whether the appellants
guarantee of free exercise was violated, the court imposed two
threshold tests on the government's action before balancing the
competing interests of the parties. First, the law must regulate
religious conduct as opposed to belief; second, the law must
have both a secular purpose and effect.9" The court found that
the resolutions affected only the conduct of the church. In spite
of the fact that the resolutions were enacted in direct response
to actions taken by the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, the
court found that the laws had the secular purpose of providing
"notice that the state exemption for ritual slaughter only ap-
plied to commercial ritual slaughter, done in slaughter-
houses."94 The court held that any effects the ordinances im-
posed on the religious practices of the Santeria religion were
merely incidental. 5
The court then went on to balance the interests of the gov-
ernment and the Santeria religion.96 The court conceded that
the resolutions will place a clear burden on the church's ability
to practice its religion. 7 However, the court also found that
the city had three compelling interests in enacting the legisla-
tion: "public health and the control of disease, the risk to chil-
dren, and animal welfare."" Applying the standard set forth
in United States v. Lee,99 the court then examined whether. an
exception from the resolutions should be made for the church.
93. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp.
1467, 1483 (S.D. Fla. 1989), affd, 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct.
2217 (1993); see Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 827, (1984). The court cited this Eleventh Circuit case as providing
the framework for analyzing challenges under the Free Exercise Clause.
94. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 723 F. Supp. at 1484.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1485.
98. Id. at 1486. The interest in animal welfare is apparent. The risks to children
stemmed from the potential for psychological side effects from witnessing animal
sacrifices. The health concerns involved carcass disposal as well as the potential for
disease in the sacrificed animals to be consumed. Id. at 1471, 1475-76.
99. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
1993] 1143
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:1127
The court found that enforcement problems would unduly inter-
fere with the city's compelling interests.' ° "A religious exemp-
tion for Santeria practitioners is simply unworkable because it
is unenforceable." 10' The court concluded that, because the in-
terests of the government fully justified the burden imposed on
the Santeria religion, the ordinances passed "constitutional
muster."'0 2  The decision was affirmed by the Eleventh
Circuit1.3 and the church's writ of certiorari was ultimately
granted by the Supreme Court.1°4
C. Supreme Court Decision
In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court voted
to reverse the lower courts' holdings that the Hialeah ordinanc-
es were constitutionally valid. °5 The Court's opinion repre-
sents an attempt to clarify the ruling in Employment Division,
Oregon Department of Human Resources v. Smith0 . by rein-
troducing strict scrutiny into the constitutional review. In deter-
mining whether the practice of animal sacrifice warranted First
Amendment protection, the Court began by referring to the
Smith holding that "a law that is neutral and of general appli-
cability need not be justified by a compelling governmental
interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a
particular religious practice."" 7 However, the Court added
that where a law does not satisfy the requirements of neutrali-
ty and general applicability, it must overcome strict scrutiny re-
100. See id. at 1487.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 936 F.2d 586
(11th Cir., 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
104. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 112 S. Ct. 1472
(1992) (granting certiorari), 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993) (reversing the Eleventh Circuit's
decision).
105. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217
(1993).
106. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
107. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 113 S. Ct. at 2226 (citing Employ-
ment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
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view."~ The Court stated that the Hialeah ordinances failed
to fulfill the threshold requirements of Smith and failed to
withstand strict scrutiny where the laws were not narrowly
tailored to accomplish their objectives.! 9
The bulk of the Court's opinion focused on the criteria set
forth in Smith. First examining the neutrality issue, the Court
rejected the city's contention that the ordinances were neutral,
i.e. they did not facially discriminate against religion.1
Although the Court found that the text of the laws included
secular terms, that did not end the facial neutrality
inquiry.' The Court found that the ordinances collectively
operated to suppress a central practice of the Santeria reli-
gion.1 Despite the concerns asserted by the city,' the
Court held that the objective of the city council was a "religious
gerrymander" targeted impermissibly at the Santeria religion
and its practices."'
In addition to evidence that the ordinances resulted in a
discriminatory effect on the church, the Court was also per-
suaded by evidence that the absolute prohibition of Santeria
sacrifice went well beyond what was necessary to achieve the
city's goals of public health and animal welfare.1 1 5 The city
did not entertain less restrictive regulatory measures that
would achieve their objectives. Rather, the only option consid-
ered was to ban ritualistic animal sacrifices, an integral part of
108. Id. "A law failing to satisfy these requirements must be justified by a com-
pelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest."
Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2227.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2228.
113. Resolution 87-66, adopted June 9, 1987, recited that "residents and citizens
of the City of Hialeah have expressed their concern that certain religions may pro-
pose practices which are inconsistent with public morals, peace, or safety' .... ." Id.
at 2227-28 (citations omitted).
114. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 113 S. Ct. at 2228 (quoting Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
115. Id. at 2229-30. For example, the Court pointed out that animal sacrifices
would be illegal even if conducted in a "licensed, inspected, and zoned" slaughter-
house. Id. at 2230. "[Tlhese broad ordinances prohibit [the] Santeria sacrifice even
when it does not threaten the city's interest in the public health." Id.
1993] 1145
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:1127
the Santeria religion." 6  Finally, the Court examined the
historical background of the ordinances as evidence that the
laws were not neutral. The Court concluded that the comments
and concerns, voiced at a meeting held before the church was
scheduled to open, demonstrated clear animosity toward the
Santeria faith." ' Based on this circumstantial evidence, the
Court deduced that "the object of the ordinances was to target
animal sacrifice by Santeria worshippers because of its religious
motivation.""8
The Court then briefly addressed whether the ordinances
were generally applicable as required by the Smith test. The
Court concluded that the ordinances were severely under-
inclusive and did not satisfy the requirement of general applica-
bility." '9 The Court noted that although the city's objective
was to prevent the unnecessary killing of animals, fishing and
extermination were not within the ambit of the laws. 20 Like-
wise, restaurants are outside the scope of the ordinances, even
though the disposal of animal carcasses was alleged to be a
primary concern underlying the public health objective of the
laws.'2' The Court concluded that because the city's ordinanc-
es imposed prohibitions on the Santeria religion, while leaving
many other activities unregulated, the ordinances clearly failed
the second part of the Smith test. 22
The Court turned to the strict scrutiny standard historically
used under the Free Exercise Clause only after completing the
Smith analysis. The Court stated that the "compelling interest
standard" was to be applied "once a law fails to meet the Smith
requirements."" The Court emphasized that the ordinances
116. Id. at 2230.
117. Id. at 2231.
118. Id. at 2231.
119. Id. at 2232.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2232-33. The Court was felt that religion alone must bear the burden
of the ordinances, while a number of secular practices within the scope of the city's
objectives were not affected. See id. at 2232.
122. Id. at 2233.
123. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 113 S. Ct. at 2233 (citing McDaniel
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were overbroad or underinclusive. "The proffered objectives
are not pursued with respect to analogous non-religious con-
duct, and those interests could be achieved by narrower ordi-
nances that burdened religion to a far lesser degree." 25
Although the absence of narrow tailoring was enough to invali-
date the ordinances, the Court also examined the objectives of
the city and found them to be uncompelling. Where "appreciable
damage" to the interests of public health and animal welfare is
left unprohibited by the ordinances, those objectives cannot be
said to be compelling interests. 6 The Court concluded that
the laws failed strict scrutiny and reversed the Eleventh
Circuit's decision.
V. THE IMPACT OF THE Hialeah DECISION ON THE STANDARD
OF REVIEW UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
The Supreme Court's analysis in the Hialeah case reintro-
duced the standard of strict scrutiny review after a seemingly
permanent exile by Smith. Although strict scrutiny has reap-
peared in the constitutional jurisprudence of challenges under
the Free Exercise Clause, the Supreme Court did nothing more
than clarify strict scrutiny review as a secondary test to be
triggered only when a government action fails to satisfy the
Smith test at a threshold level. Under Hialeah, a law which
passes the "neutral and generally applicable" requirements of
Smith would escape strict scrutiny entirely. While the Hialeah
decision represented a reversion toward the strict scrutiny
founded in Sherbert v. Verner,2 ' the Smith test was not dis-
placed by the reemergence of strict scrutiny. Under Smith, if a
law was found to be neutral and generally applicable, the Court
would assume that the First Amendment had not been offend-
v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978), quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215
(1972)).
Quoting the Smith opinion, the Court stated that the standard was not "wa-
ter[ed] ... down" but "really means what it says." Id.
124. Id. at 2234.
125. Id.
126. See id. (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541-42 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring)).
127. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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ed.121 In Smith, the issue of accommodating a religion by ex-
emption to such a law was a matter better left for the "political
process." 29 Without any contrary indication in the Hialeah
case, these aspects of free exercise analysis were not affected.
The Hialeah Court resorted to strict scrutiny only after a
lengthy analysis of the factors instituted in Smith.30
The Court's implementation of a new two-tiered approach in
Hialeah was an exercise in redundancy. The ordinances prohib-
iting animal sacrifice failed the Smith test for the same reasons
that they failed strict scrutiny. The Court held that the ordi-
nances were not neutral in the face of evidence of "improper
targeting of Santeria sacrifice in the fact that they proscribe
more religious conduct than is necessary to achieve their stated
ends." 3' Furthermore, the Court also held that the ordinances
were not generally applicable because they were underinclusive
in light of the city's interests in public health and animal wel-
fare. 3 2 This reasoning echoed the "narrowly tailored" compo-
nent under strict scrutiny review where focus is likewise on the
breadth of the law, as compared to the objective to be achieved.
It was only logical that the Court would reiterate the same
reasoning when analyzing the city's ordinances under strict
scrutiny. Before even engaging in strict scrutiny review, the
majority conceded that "[iut follows from what we have already
said that these ordinances cannot withstand this scrutiny."'33
The Court went on to repeat its rationale as to why the over-
broad and underinclusive aspects of the ordinances render them
unconstitutional. The redundancy in the majority's opinion was
128. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
878 (1990).
129. See id. at 890.
130. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct.
2217, 2226-33 (1993). The Court stated that "[a] law failing to satisfy these re-
quirements must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be
narrowly tailored to advance that interest." Id. at 2226.
131. Id. at 2229.
132. See id. at 2232-33.
133. Id. at 2233 (emphasis added).
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not unnoticed by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor in their con-
currence.
13 4
Thus, unlike the majority, I do not believe that "[a] law
burdening religious practice that is not neutral or of general
application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny." In
my view, regulation that targets religion in this way, ipso
facto, fails strict scrutiny. It is for this reason that a stat-
ute that explicitly restricts religious practices violates the
First Amendment.3
As Justice Blackmun noted, it was curious that the majority
engaged in strict scrutiny review after it had already been
demonstrated that the city's ordinances would fail an existing
test. Although strict scrutiny resurfaced in the Hialeah case, its
coupling with the determinative factors set forth in Smith as-
sured that it was not restored to the stature it commanded in
earlier free exercise doctrine. The Hialeah decision Was merely
a small step toward the reinstatement of strict scrutiny review.
The process of reinstating the standard was accelerated for the
Court by Congress in its passage of the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act.
IV. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT:
RESURRECTION OF STRICT SCRUTINY REVIEW BY CONGRESS
Congress introduced the RFRA bill in direct response to the
Supreme Court's renunciation of strict scrutiny review in
Employment Division, Oregon Department of Human Resources
v. Smith.'36 The new law mandates that substantial burdens
imposed by the government on an individual's right to free
exercise be the "least restrictive means of furthering ... [a]
134. Id. at 2250 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 2251 (quoting id. at 2233).
136. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See H.R. REP. No. 88, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. at 6
(1993). "To reach its decision in the Smith case, the majority had to strain its
reading of the First Amendment and ignore years of precedent in which the
compelling governmental interest test was applied in a variety of circumstances." Id.
at 4; see also Mary A. Schmabel, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A Prison's
Dilemma, 29 WILLIAMM'rr L. REv. 323, 323 (1993).
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compelling governmental interest."" Sponsors of RFRA felt
that the Smith test placed a heavy burden on a claimant to
show an unconstitutional legislative motive behind seemingly
neutral, generally applicable laws. Determining the true legisla-
tive purpose of a law is difficult and courts have been unwilling
to engage in such speculation." 8 Another criticism of the
Smith decision was the Court's deference to the political process
as the appropriate medium for enacting religious exemptions to
generally applicable statutes. The right to freely exercise one's
religion should not be submitted to a vote or subject to majori-
ties. 13
9
Thus, when President Clinton signed the RFRA bill into law
on November 16, 1993, the Supreme Court's holding in Smith
that strict scrutiny review was not appropriate for generally
applicable laws was overruled. 4 ° Proponents of the bill em-
phasized that the passage of RFRA would not serve to invali-
date remaining free exercise jurisprudence. In particular, the
holdings in Bowen v. Roy' and Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n4 were distinguished on the grounds
that the burdens in each were found to be incidental.'3
RFRA also has no effect on Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah... in which the Court found that the
ordinances in question were targeted at a particular religious
sect. '4 The impact of RFRA is the resurrection of the strict
137. RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488.
138. Id. See also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113
S. CT. 2217, 2239-40 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). "[Ilt is virtually impossible to
determine the singular 'motive' of a collective legislative body, and this Court has a
long tradition of refraining from such inquiries." Id. (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578, 636-39 (1987); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968);
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 130-31 (1810)).
139. See RFRA, H.R. REP. No. 88, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. at 5-6 (1993).
140. For a discussion of Congressional authority to reverse a ruling of the
Supreme Court, see Rex E. Lee, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 73, 90-95 (1993).
141. 476 U.S. 673 (1986).
142. 485 U.S. 439 (1987).
143. 139 CONG. REC. S14470 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement from Sen.
Hatch).
144. 113 S. CT. 2217 (1993).
145. 139 CONG. REC. S14467 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement from Sen. Ken-
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scrutiny standard set forth in Sherbert v. Verner 4 s as the
appropriate level of review for substantial burdens imposed by
generally applicable laws.
V. CONCLUSION
In his strong dissent in Employment Division, Oregon Depart-
ment of Human Resources v. Smith, Justice Blackmun may
have unwittingly foretold of the eventual preemption of the
Supreme Court by Congress regarding the judicial standard of
review afforded to challenges under the Free Exercise Clause.
This Court over the years painstakingly has developed a
consistent and exacting standard to test the constitutional-
ity of a state statute that burdens the free exercise of reli-
gion. ... Until today, I thought this was a settled and
inviolate principle of this Court's First Amendment jurispru-
dence.'47
Although the Supreme Court in Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah demonstrated a move toward
heightened protection of religious practices under the Free Ex-
ercise Clause, the full restoration of strict scrutiny review may
have taken as many years as it took to establish the standard
in the first place. By the intervention of Congress in enacting
RFRA, there can be no doubt that burdens on the right to free
exercise will not survive without the highest justification. An
era in First Amendment jurisprudence has come to an untimely
end.
Laura A. Colombell
nedy).
146. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
147. Employment Div., Ore. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 907-08
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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